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In the opening essay to this collection, J. R. Hale poses two questions:
If the clock were stopped about the year 1500, how much violence would
we see in western Europe? And what sense could be made of it? Hale’s
essay provides background for the theme of violence in the later Middle
Ages and stands as a balanced survey. He touches most of the appropriate
bases emerging with an overview that merits attention. The fifteenth
century is seen as relatively free from the collective violence soon to come.
The fury of sectarianism and the dislocations prompted by the price
revolution were in the offing. After a series of cautious disclaimers, Hale
describes the later Middle Ages as being less violence-prone than the
centuries ahead. In passing he notes that governments tended to move
away from cruel and unusual punishments toward a system of adjudication
and compromise of disputes. Except for political crimes, the tendency of
courts was to search for modes of settlement and reconciliation.
The remaining essays treat the special theme of violence and disorder in
Italy from the thirteenth through the early sixteenth century. With the
exception of John Larner’s piece on the Romagna, the contributors focus
on urban life. J_ Hyde summarizes contemporary opinion on factional
strife in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italy; he reviews the writings
of chroniclers, political tinkers, and poets to determine leading features
of judgment on the topic of endemic civil discord. R. Brentano in his
study of strife and contention in thirteenth-century Rome correctly points
out the implications of Wallare-HadriH’s research for those interested in
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the later Middle Ages: the threat of clan violence operated to create
government as well as to undermine it. Students of the world of medieval
Italian city-states should recognize that urban peace could best be
promoted when the clans exercised control over their membership.
Modern scholarship dwells too extensively on the divisive features of the
politics of consorterie. Treaties and agreements between rival clans were
the surest guarantee for urban stability.
D. Herlihy presents valuable demographic details in an attempt to
confirm his psychological perspective on violence in the Tuscan cities.
From his data he constructs a profile of a youthful society rife with sexual
frustration and burdened with deprivation. The evidence for Florence does
not in fact always support his bold correlations, and even the data
presented is not entirely convincing. Most premodern societies would offer
the same youthful demographic profile; Florence is surely not unique.
Important differences in patterns of violence cannot readily be explained
on the basis of a youth culture. Herlihy sees late marriages, a sizable age
discrepancy between husband and wife, and other demographic factors as
creating a world of adolescence characterized by a frustrated and
violence-prone youth. A study of the Florentine court records suggests,
however, a substantial decrease in crimes of violence for the period Herlihy
surveys. In fact, the age patterns displayed by fifteenth-century Florence
differ little from those of many another premodern, traditional society.
Peter Laslett, among others, discusses this question in his book, The World
We Have Lost.
G. Brucker writes on the artisan-worker cadre in Florence from 1340 to
1450, stressing the extreme mobility of the poor and near-poor of the city.
He shows that alienation is by no means an exclusively modern urban
phenomenon. W. Bowsky’s conclusions on minuti violence in Siena parallel
those of Brucker for Florence: &dquo;The poor may riot spontaneously when
hungry, but I suspect that in most conspiracies magnates or ambitious
popolani gras,s~ utilized them for their own purposes.&dquo; Both Bowsky and
Brucker see minuti violence as a reflex of upper-class politics. Such a
perspective does little to illuminate the question of why violence among
workers erupted at particular moments of patrician strife and not at
others.
L Martines provides an introduction and conclusion to this volume,
while V. Ilardi contributes a long piece on the assassination of Galeazzo
Maria Sforza. W. Gundersheimer treats Ferrara from 1440 to 1500 and
after, successfully demonstrating that capital punishment was reserved
primarily for those convicted of crimes against the state. S. Chojnacki
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describes the Venetian judicial system of the fourteenth century as
bringing to trial for capital crimes noble and commoner alike. The above
two studies suggest that a decisive change did occur in the pattern of urban
violence with the taming of the nobility. One difference between Italy and
the north of Europe may rest in the fact that the urban patrician of the
Italian town was more likely to be brought to justice than his northern
European confrere. The implications of modifying the behavior of an
urban aristocracy are of course far-reaching for any student of Renaissance
culture.
Hale’s overview may well obtain: the fifteenth century was a time of
decreasing urban violence with the nobility tamed and worker unrest
diminished. It may be that what Braudel described as the golden age of the
worker with its steady wages and stable prices brought a greater measure
of tranquility to the urban scene. My own impulse would be to accent the
rise of state power and the decline of quasi-autonomous forms of political
association. Much collective unrest in the cities during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries was the consequence of the activities of numerous
armed familial and corporate associations. These armed societies were, I
believe, the model for early worker movements. Interestingly enough,
many of the leaders of the Florentine Ciompi were ex-mercenaries, as has
been shown by Brucker. Practice in warfare and militia duty served to
school minuti in the arts of organization and urban combat. likewise, the
consorterie of the nobles were associations for clan defense. During the
fourteenth century these armed societies lost much power along with the
decline of the rural and urban militias. By the early fifteenth century the
territorial (or regional) state had a virtual monopoly of force and could
keep the public peace with deadly effectiveness.
Of course the question remains: against whom were the energies of the
state directed? Judging from the conclusions of several of these studies,
one can surmise that the victims of this fierce justice were the politically
seditious and the vagrant of the cities. Evidence from fifteenth-century
Tuscan court records bears this out. What is not developed in these studies
is the very important theme of mechanisms for arbitration and concili-
ation. Even the complex system of making bail and posting bond is not
amplified. In the fifteenth century variegated procedures for restoration of
the criminal back into society were widely practiced-not only in Italy but
throughout Europe. It would appear, then, that the power of the state was
effectively combined with traditional strategies for resolving disputes; in
tandem, the carrot and the stick worked well to dampen the level of urban
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violence. Several of the present studies discuss sixteenth-century Italian
social theory pertaining to the nature of urban crime and justice. The
statements of these theorists support the notion that state power coupled
with appropriate techniques for rehabilitation of the outlaw served the
Italian city-states quite well.
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